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RESPONSE 
 
SECTION 2 IS DEAD:  LONG LIVE SECTION 2  
Guy-Uriel E. Charles† 
In response to Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2:  Of 
Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 377 (2012). 
 
Voting rights law is in the midst of an existential crisis.  The Voting 
Rights Act (VRA) is probably the most celebrated civil rights statute 
ever enacted by Congress.1  By most accounts, the central concern that 
gave rise to the VRA—racial animus against black voters and black 
candidates by white state and private actors—has, blessedly, retreated 
into the annals of history since the Act’s passage.2  Bull Connor is 
dead; black voters can register and vote on par with white voters; black 
candidates can run for office, and white voters will vote for them; the 
voting rights framework now incorporates Latinos and other Ameri-
cans of color, allowing more individuals to take advantage of the pro-
 
† Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.  Thanks to Christopher 
Elmendorf and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer. 
1 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973bb-1 (2006)). 
2 See Grant M. Hayden, Resolving the Dilemma of Minority Representation, 92 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1589, 1591 (2004) (describing the success of the VRA in ensuring minority access 
to the polls and increasing minority representation in legislatures); Richard H. Pildes, 
Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself?  Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 
N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1529-39 (2002) (reviewing social-science studies that found an 
increasing prevalence of white voters supporting black political candidates); Michael J. 
Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act:  A Once and Future Remedy?, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 
225, 249 (2003) (explaining how the diminished level of purposeful discrimination 
may make an extension of Section 5 unconstitutional). 
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tections of the VRA; and a black man is President of the United States.  
Though isolated instances of racial animus in voting persist, and may 
be with us always, the VRA has replaced the systematic, state-sponsored 
racial exclusion that affected the rights of millions of American citi-
zens seeking to participate in the political process with a new reality.  
Literacy tests are no more, at least as a feature of the electoral process; 
grandfather clauses are buried with the grandfathers; retaliation by 
private employers against black voters who dared to register to vote 
exists only in our memories, if at all; and few twenty-first century 
Americans could imagine that anyone would assault a voter or group 
of voters for exercising their right to vote, much less that the state 
would fail to prosecute such an attacker.  The question then is what 
steps remain for voting rights policy. 
Voting rights law, doctrine, practice, and, pointedly, scholarship 
have been unable to figure out the next move.  Some scholars argue 
that it is time to sunset the VRA.3  Others have proposed new alterna-
tives and modifications.4  The Supreme Court has threatened to strike 
down one of the Act’s most central provisions, Section 5,5 on constitu-
tional grounds,6 while commentators—including some Justices on the 
Supreme Court—have argued that the VRA’s other central provision, 
Section 2,7 is unconstitutional.8  No sophisticated student of voting 
 
3 Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1731 (2004). 
4 See Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act:  Section 5 and the Opt-In 
Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 716 (2006) (proposing an “opt-in” system that 
would “create space for community and legislative leaders to negotiate the best deal 
possible for racial minorities but place a bargaining chip in their pockets—a chance to 
demand that the Act’s traditional constraints apply should bargaining break down”). 
5 VRA § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006) (subjecting to review any attempt to change 
“any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure 
with respect to voting” in defined jurisdictions). 
6 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 129 S. Ct. 2504, 
2513 (2009) (suggesting that the VRA is unconstitutional, but finding alternative 
grounds for the holding). 
7 VRA § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006) (prohibiting any voting qualification or prereq-
uisite that discriminates on the basis of race or color).  
8 See Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1250 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(reiterating his position from his concurring opinion in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 
891 (1994), that Section 2 of the VRA does not authorize vote dilution claims, and 
suggesting that such an interpretation makes the statute unconstitutional); Georgia v. 
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 491 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (considering it a “fun-
damental flaw” that “the Department of Justice is permitted or directed to encourage 
or ratify a course of unconstitutional conduct in order to find compliance with a statu-
tory directive”); cf. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 
399, 511 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (questioning 
the court’s role in “rejiggering the district lines under § 2”). 
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rights would be surprised if the Court were to strike down Section 2 or 
Section 5 as unconstitutional within the next two to five years.  
Leaving aside the constitutional questions—which may ultimately 
be fatal to the Act—the policy questions are equally pressing.  What 
does vote dilution mean in a political context in which the vast majori-
ty of African-American voters—and increasingly Latinos—support the 
Democratic Party?  What does racial bloc voting mean when black vot-
ers are unwilling to vote for black Republican candidates but some 
white voters will vote for the Republican candidate regardless of race?  
Is it racial discrimination if a Republican state legislature adopts a vot-
er identification requirement when the law will likely have a dispro-
portionate impact on the state’s Democratic voters, a plurality of 
whom would be voters of color?  Is such a voter identification re-
quirement a barrier to political participation and thus a violation of 
Section 2?  When should a state’s failure to draw coalition and influ-
ence districts be a violation of Section 2?  Why are felon disenfran-
chisement statutes consistent with Section 2?  What is the 
constitutional expiration date on Section 2’s results test?  These are 
just a small sample of the types of questions raised by voting rights 
policy that are not only currently unanswered, but that we do not 
seem to know how to answer. 
In Making Sense of Section 2, Christopher Elmendorf tackles some of 
these problems head-on.  Professor Elmendorf’s purpose is to resur-
rect and save Section 2.  In particular, he focuses on three criticisms 
that judges, practitioners, and academics have lodged against Section 
2.  They have argued that Section 2’s standard is difficult to apply, that 
remedies for violations of Section 2 will contribute to racial balkaniza-
tion, and that Section 2 is unconstitutional.   
Professor Elmendorf makes a number of moves in his article.  First, 
he ascribes to the VRA and Section 2 the purpose of quickening the 
“waning of racism in American politics.”9  Second, he argues that Sec-
tion 2 “should be understood as a delegation of authority to the courts 
to develop a common law of racially fair elections, guided by certain 
substantive and evidentiary norms as well as norms about legal 
change.”10  Third, Professor Elmendorf reorients Section 2’s substan-
tive standard from the factors set forth in Thornburg v. Gingles11 and the 
 
9 Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2:  Of Biased Votes, Unconstitu-
tional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 381 (2012). 
10 Id. at 383. 
11 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (finding that the plaintiff must show that a group is 
“sufficiently large and geographically compact”; that it is “politically cohesive”; and that 
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totality of circumstances approach rooted in Section 2’s legislative his-
tory to a focus on “race-biased decisionmaking.”12  He defines “race-
biased decisionmaking” as an electoral decision that was affected by 
the decisionmaker’s consideration of the subject’s race.13  This sub-
stantive standard would cover both dilution claims and participation 
claims.  Finally, Professor Elmendorf offers two particularly innovative 
applications of this new substantive Section 2 standard.  Section 2, 
Professor Elmendorf argues, should be used to respond “to the prob-
lem of election outcomes that are unconstitutional because of the role 
of race in the electorate’s verdict.”14  Given that these types of claims 
would not be justiciable under the Court’s political question doctrine, 
the Court can address those claims under a statutory framework.15  
Presumably, these are claims where white (or black) voters refuse to 
vote for a black candidate (or white candidate in the case of black 
voters) because of the candidate’s race.  Section 2 would also address 
“depolarization claims,” which Professor Elemendorf defines as 
claims alleging that an electoral structure has “unreasonably in-
duce[d] or sustain[ed] race-biased voting.”16 
There is much to admire about Making Sense of Section 2.  I think 
Professor Elemendorf is clearly right that courts should interpret Sec-
tion 2 in the same way that they develop the common law.  It is not 
surprising that I would take this view given that Professor Luis Fuentes-
Rohwer and I have advanced a similar and broader argument.17  In 
our view, the Court has interpreted the VRA consistent with a com-
mon law approach and in partnership with both Congress and, to a 
more limited extent, the Department of Justice.  One cannot fully ap-
preciate the development and evolution of voting rights policy without 
understanding how those three institutions have interacted together to 
give effect to the often-shared, at least at the outset, constitutional vision 
of the Fifteenth Amendment and the statutory aspirations of the VRA.  
But this common law approach has its limits, and in this regard, 
Making Sense of Section 2 raises as many questions as it answers, as a 
good article should.  Voting rights policy’s existential crisis is due in 
 
a white majority generally votes as a bloc, which overcomes the minority group’s pre-
ferred candidate). 
12 Elmendorf, supra note 9, at 383. 
13 Id. at 384. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 414-15. 
16 Id. at 385. 
17 See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Superstatutory Interpretation 
(2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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large part to its failure to come to terms with the purpose of voting 
rights law in the twenty-first century.  Professor Elmendorf squares up 
to this problem by recognizing a supposed consensus with respect to 
the purpose of Section 2 between both liberals and conservatives on 
the Court.  Section 2’s purpose, and maybe that of the VRA more 
broadly, is to reduce if not eliminate racism in American politics.  But 
this move is question-begging:  what is racism in American politics, 
and how will we know whether it is waning?  Resolving that inquiry is a 
necessary condition to rehabilitating Section 2.  Without an adequate 
conceptual understanding of the racism that Section 2 ought not to 
tolerate in the political process, it is hard to evaluate Professor 
Elmendorf’s innovative and important contributions to Section 2’s 
future development, namely:  (1) his introduction of race-biased deci-
sionmaking as the substantive standard under Section 2; (2) his focus 
on unconstitutional outcomes to justify and guide the constitutional 
scope of Section 2; and (3) the relevance of depolarization claims un-
der this new understanding of Section 2.  
Is the telos of Section 2 the removal of Jim Crow–like barriers to po-
litical participation?  If the racism is defined as or limited to racial an-
imus, then the conservatives are right that there is nothing left for 
voting rights policy to vindicate.  The Voting Rights Act has largely 
achieved this purpose, and Section 2 should only be preserved in the 
annals of history.  Relatedly and more specific to Professor Elmen-
dorf’s project, if racial animus is the evil that Section 2 is seeking to 
eradicate, then it is not clear what the introduction of “race-biased 
decisionmaking” would add to the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amend-
ment standards and whether depolarization claims would be any dif-
ferent from ordinary Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims.  
Again, the inevitable conclusion, at least under this understanding of 
racism as Jim Crow, is that there is nothing left for Section 2 to do. 
If race-biased and depolarizing claims are not aimed at Jim Crow–
style racial animus in the political process, then what types of race-
tinged political behavior would implicate Section 2’s substantive 
standard?  Professor Elmendorf suggests “prejudiced voting by majority-
group citizens causes a participation harm within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2 whenever it burdens minorities’ efforts to participate in normal 
party politics.”18  But Making Sense of Section 2 does not define preju-
dice or its conceptual complement, normal politics.  If we discard Jim 
Crow–type prejudice as a possibility, then the next best doctrinal op-
 
18 Elmendorf, supra note 9, at 420. 
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tion is a disparate impact standard.  We could, for example, rewrite 
the sentence above to say that “whenever a majority votes as a bloc to 
defeat the minority’s preferred candidate, minority voters suffer a 
participation harm within the meaning of Section 2.”  But of course 
this is the Gingles standard, which Making Sense of Section 2 rejects ex-
plicitly and maybe rightly so.   
For a slightly different perspective, one could borrow an interpre-
tation of the Court’s decision in League of United Latin American Citizens 
v. Perry (LULAC) to reconstitute a workable intent standard.19  In LU-
LAC, Latino plaintiffs argued that Texas violated Section 2 of the VRA 
when it removed some Latino voters from a district in order to prevent 
Latinos as a group from voting out the incumbent representative.20  In 
his opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy not only agreed with the 
Section 2 claim, but he also implied, rather strongly, that the state’s 
action might constitute intentional discrimination in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.21  Though it is hard to parse this cryptic ar-
gument, and though it might mean nothing more than a reiteration 
of the classical intent standard,22 it might also mean that Justice Ken-
nedy is amenable to a redefinition of the intent standard in order to 
reach certain types of voting rights violations.23  If this is true, then it 
would mean that the state engages in intentional race discrimination 
in the electoral process when its actions burden voters (of color? nu-
merical minorities? incipient political majorities?) and that the state 
does not have a compelling justification for imposing that intentional 
burden.  The difference, of course, between this redefinition and clas-
sical equal protection doctrine is that classical equal protection doc-
trine does not apply heightened scrutiny unless the state burdened 
voters of color because of their race.24  Under this redefinition, it 
might not matter whether the voters burdened are voters of color, 
and it certainly does not matter that race was not the reason for im-
posing the burden.  Again, it is not clear whether this is a robust line 
of inquiry, but it would have been an interesting one for Professor 
Elmendorf to explore. 
 
19 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
20 Id. at 423-25.  
21 Id. at 440. 
22 See Ellen D. Katz, Reviving the Right to Vote, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1163, 1171 (2007) (con-
cluding, however, that the LULAC opinion does more than reiterate the intent standard).  
23 For a preliminary attempt at this redefinition, see Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Race, Re-
districting, and Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1185, 1207-10 (2007).  
24 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976). 
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Moreover, this line of inquiry—redefining the intent standard to-
ward the aperture opened up by Justice Kennedy in LULAC—is con-
gruent with another one of Professor Elmendorf’s important aims, 
which is to shore up the constitutionality of Section 2.  Professor 
Elmendorf tackles that task by offering a series of arguments that 
build on each other but, like a game of Jenga, become more precari-
ous as each block is added to the tower.  The first move is the argu-
ment that voters, as a collective, are state actors.25  According to this 
argument, voters are an “it” and not a “they,” and as an “it,” their col-
lective behavior constitutes state action.  Professor Elmendorf argues 
next that election outcomes are unconstitutional when they are the 
product of “race-biased voting.”26  Presumably, this means that it is 
unconstitutional for white voters to elect, for example, a white repre-
sentative because these voters prefer the white representative to a hy-
pothetical black challenger on racial grounds.  At the same time, Pro-
Professor Elmendorf argues that each voter’s individual decision—and 
by hypothesis, racist decision—is constitutionally protected but that 
the aggregation of those decisions constitutes state action and violates 
the Constitution.27  Professor Elmendorf next concedes that even 
though the electoral outcome is state action, it would not be justicia-
ble because of the lack of remedy for the constitutional violation.28 
From this rather unstable tower of reasoning, Professor Elmendorf 
derives two implications.  First, the Court should interpret its constitu-
tional standard for assessing Congress’s power to promulgate Section 
2 in light of the fact that Section 2 is attempting to reach constitution-
al violations that would not be justiciable under the Constitution.29  
Second, Section 2 ought to recognize “depolarization claims,” which 
manifest themselves where the electoral structure promotes or facili-
tates race-biased electoral behavior.30  Under Professor Elmendorf’s 
framework, depolarization claims under Section 2 would make up for 
the fact that the unconstitutional outcome cases are not justiciable.  
Functionally, these depolarization claims would replace the Gingles or 
totality of circumstances standard. 
The problem with this framework is that intellectually it is quite 
fragile.  First, one has to buy into the distinction between the right to 
 
25 Elmendorf, supra note 9, at 430-32. 
26 Id. at 430. 
27 Id. at 432. 
28 Id. at 437-38. 
29 Id. at 441-42. 
30 Id. at 442. 
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vote as an individual right and as an aggregate right.  Second, one has 
to agree that the individual right is protected by the First Amendment, 
but the aggregate right is not.  Third, and this is a familiar refrain, one 
would have to distinguish between instances where voters prefer a 
candidate for benign reasons and where voters prefer a candidate on 
the basis of race for malign reasons.  Fourth and finally, one would 
have to agree that the Fourteenth Amendment is relevant to electoral 
outcomes.  Each of these moves is deeply contested in election law 
scholarship, to put it mildly.31  In my view, they are also unnecessary 
for Professor Elmendorf’s conclusion.  
From an altogether different vantage point, one could argue that 
the telos of voting rights policy is to ensure consequential political par-
ticipation by voters of color.  Put differently, maybe voting rights 
scholars need to articulate a right of political participation that is un-
moored to any conception of racial discrimination.  It is a small step 
from Professor Elmendorf’s concept of depolarization to a normative 
argument that electoral structures should not submerge completely 
the rights of racial minorities.32  This might kill the current Section 2 
framework, but we might have to kill Section 2 to save it.   
Conceptually, I am increasingly attracted to a universal, as opposed 
to race-based, approach to thinking about electoral inequality.  But a 
right of consequential political participation for voters of color may 
paradoxically be a critical way station.  That is, in the process of uni-
versalizing voting rights policy, one can begin by articulating a right of 
consequential political participation based upon race, while recogniz-
ing that this is not the ultimate limitation of the right.  If it is possible 
to reason out from race,33 and even if it is not, then one might move 
voting rights policy toward removing barriers to political participation, 
even if those barriers do not have a disparate racial impact. 
 
31 See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral Structures, and the First 
Amendment Right of Association, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1209, 1279 (2003) (“The state’s pur-
pose should not be to try to remove race as a factor in American politics; instead, this 
choice should be left to individuals.”); Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an 
Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663, 1718 (2001) (cautioning against fitting aggre-
gate rights into the “conventional individual rights framework”); Pamela S. Karlan, The 
Rights to Vote:  Some Pessimism about Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1707-08 (1993) 
(explaining the aggregate components of the right to vote). 
32 See generally LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY:  FUNDAMENTAL 
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994).  
33 This is not an insignificant hurdle, if the Court’s experience in Vieth v. Jubelirer is 
at all instructive.  See 541 U.S. 267, 284-87 (2003) (noting that the Court’s experience 
with racial gerrymandering is irrelevant in the context of partisan gerrymandering). 
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Professor Elemendorf’s article is a thoughtful and learned exposi-
tion on what ails Section 2 of the VRA specifically, but captures much 
of the VRA more generally.  It is bold in its solutions and rich in its 
details.  He not only helps us understand how to make sense of Sec-
tion 2, but also that we might have to kill Section 2 in order to save it. 
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